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In re Bernstein

BANKRUPTCY; LIENS; FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS—If there is at least one theoretical creditor that could avail itself of the one year tolling (after discovery) period under the Fraudulent Transfer Act, then a trustee in bankruptcy can pursue a fraudulent transfer claim even if more than four years have passed since a suspect real property transfer took place.

In re Giberson

BANKRUPTCY; COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL—A party cannot use the bankruptcy court to relitigate a state court’s prior determination of equitable or legal ownership of property.

In re Bernardes

BANKRUPTCY; CLAIMS—The value of collateral establishing the secured or unsecured status of a claim is to be determined as of the effective date of the plan, which date courts have held variously to be the date the petition was filed or the date of confirmation of the plan.

Petit-Clair v. Nelson

ATTORNEYS; MORTGAGES—An attorney may not obtain a mortgage from a client to secure a fee unless the client is advised of the desirability of obtaining independent counsel and is given a reasonable opportunity to do so.

Caruso v. Ravenswood Developers, Inc.

ARBITRATION; CONTRACTS; CONSUMER FRAUD ACT—When a contract provides for broad arbitration, even consumer fraud claims and RICO claims can be heard by the arbitrator.

MacCartney v. Meyer

ARBITRATION—Partiality by an arbitrator means a demonstrable conflict of interest; an allegedly one-sided award is not evidence of partiality.

In re Petition For Substantive Certification, Twp. of Southampton, County of Burlington, N.J.

AFFORDABLE HOUSING—The Council on Affordable Housing should not disregarded or give only perfunctory consideration to information supplied by a property owner or other interested parties concerning the feasibility of a compliance plan simply because such a party has not filed a timely objection to the plan.

The Trust Under Article Sixth of the Will of Sigmund Sommer v. Reliance Associates

ADVERSE POSSESSION—Where property is located in an area where people tolerate occasional trespassing and cutting up of fallen trees, such use can be considered permissive and contrary to what is needed to shown ownership by adverse possession.

J & M Land Company v. First Union National Bank

ADVERSE POSSESSION—Title does not vest by adverse possession until 30 years (or 60 years, in the case of uncultivated land) because the 20 year statute is only procedural and thus only sets a time limit on when judicial authority may be invoked by a landowner to obtain possession.

Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway

ADULT BUSINESSES—The state law that bars locating adult businesses within 1,000 feet of a residential neighborhood overrides the grandfathering provisions under municipal law that would otherwise permit such businesses.

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