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Joseph v. Lehrer

BROKERS; COMMISSIONS—Under certain circumstances, a broker’s break-up fee is appropriate and it may be more than what a sales commission would have been.

Benya v. Slous

BROKERS—A party to a residential contract has no claim for interference against a broker just because the broker induces the other party to have its attorney cancel the contract within the three day attorney review period.

Brown v. Lucas

BOUNDARIES—Expert testimony is required to prove a boundary line and even if someone is personally familiar with the boundary line, that person must certify that he or she has the requisite skill or knowledge to provide testimony.

In Re Steck

BANKRUPTCY; LIENS—A debtor may use the lien avoidance powers of a bankruptcy trustee in a Chapter 11 case, but not in a Chapter 13 case, and to avoid a transfer of exempt property a debtor must act within the statutory two year time limit.

In Re Slack

BANKRUPTCY; LEASES—Even if a tenant does not list its landlord as a creditor, the lease is deemed rejected sixty days after a bankruptcy petition is filed if not expressly assumed in that time.

In Re Walden Ridge Development, LLC

BANKRUPTCY; BAD FAITH—Using an single asset, single purpose entity to contract for a property purchase is a routine way to acquire and develop property and does not lend credence to a claim that a bankrupt debtor acted in bad faith when structuring its transaction before filing.

Strike Associates, LLC v. Art Semeraro Construction Company, Inc.

ARBITRATION; CONSTRUCTION LIENS—Even in the context of resolving a construction lien dispute, an arbitrator’s decision will be honored absent fraud, corruption or undue influence and silence by an arbitrator as to whether there was a wilful misstatement of a contractor’s claim is to be taken as a finding that there was not.

Ames v. Township of Jefferson

ADVERSE POSSESSION; MUNICIPALITIES—Intentional hostility is not required to prove that an adverse use is notorious and the public’s use of a private strip of land as a roadway qualifies as such; therefore, a municipality can assert rights by way of adverse possession on that basis and is not limited to taking the strip of land by way of eminent domain.

Estate of Cannara v. County of Essex

ADVERSE POSSESSION—To be exempt from claims based upon adverse possession, governmentally owned property need only be used or dedicated for a public purpose.

City of Long Branch v. Liu

ACCRETION; AVULSION—Beachfront land that grows because the government has pumped sand from elsewhere is created by avulsion, not accretion, and does not become owned by the abutting landowner.

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